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An International Symposium
THE BLEIBURG MASSACRES In
1945, the overwhelming majority of Croatian people returned to Yugoslavia
from Austria were not killed at Bleiburg itself, but following their
recrossing of the Drava. However, historically the involuntary repatriation
of Croats in that year has long borne the name of the Austrian town where
their Calvary began. I do not propose on this occasion to attempt any
detailed account of the fate of the unfortunate victims after they had been
returned to Yugoslavia, nor to attempt any statistical estimate, since these
are topics at present undergoing specialised research within Croatia. I
intend here to concentrate attention on one aspect of the greater event,
which to this day remains a strange and sinister mystery: the decision of the
British military authorities to hand the Croats over to be slaughtered has
never received any satisfactory explanation. It is an enigma which I have
been researching now for nearly twenty years, to which even now I am unable
to provide a coherent account, which is consistent with currently available
evidence and historically more satisfactory account contained in my book
The Minister and the Massacres (1986), and the curious
version of events which appears in the British Government’s authorised
report, The Repatriations from Austria in 1945 (1990). It
is an exceptionally difficult history to explore, largely because of the unusual
obstacles placed in the path of anyone attempting to investigate it. The
English historian Herbert Butterfield once wrote: ‘There
are two maxims for historians which so harmonise with what I know of history
that I would like to claim them as my own, though they really belong to
nineteenth-century historiography: first, that governments try to press upon
the historian the key to all the drawers but one, and are anxious to spread
the belief that this single one contains no secret of importance; secondly,
that if the historian can only find the thing which the government does not
want him to know, he will lay his hand upon something that is likely to be
significant’.1 In
my case the situation has been almost the other way round. The British
Government permitted me to inspect a few carefully-selected drawers, while
the remainder were kept firmly closed. Before attempting my own explanation,
an important matter needs to be emphasised. That is the distinction which
should be drawn between the tragedy of the Croats driven back to Tito at
Bleiburg on 12 May 1945, and the subsequent fate of the smaller body of
Croats who remained in Austria following the Bleiburg tragedy. The
events at Bleiburg are simply described. During the first fortnight of May
1945, as the war drew to a close in Yugoslavia, terrified people of all
ethnic categories in Yugoslavia streamed across the Karavanken mountains and
the River Drava in a desperate attempt to surrender to the British. What they
sought above all was protection from the Communist Partisans. Fearful
massacres were being perpetrated behind the Yugoslav lines, and there were
few who did not anticipate a ghastly fate in the event of capture, regardless
of their actions during the chaotic years of occupation and war. Shortly
after midnight on 13 May the British 5th Corps Headquarters in Austria
estimated that ‘approximately 30,000 POWs, surrendered personnel, and
refugees in Corps area. A further 60,000 reported moving north to Austria
from Yugoslavia. I am taking all possible steps to prevent their movement
along roads, but this will NOT completely prevent them as they are short of
food and are being harassed. Should this number materialise food and guard
situation will become critical’. The 60,000 referred to were Croatian
Domobran and Ustache military formations, followed by a vast concourse of
civilian refugees. By
15 May, the head of the advancing Croatian column arrived in the meadows just
south of Bleiburg in southern Carinthia. There the Headquarters of the
British 38th Infantry Brigade had been established a few days earlier within
the massive walls of Bleiburg Castle overlooking the town on the edge of the
adjacent forest. The Croatian commander, General Herencic, together with his
interpreter Danijel Crljen, drove up to the castle, where they attempted to
negotiate a surrender on terms with the British Brigadier Patrick Scott.
However they had no sooner made themselves known to Scott, than the Yugoslav
General Milan Basta arrived on the scene and insisted on joining the talks.
Basta and Scott swiftly decided that they would compel Herencic to surrender
all Croats under his command to the Yugoslav forces. Scott made it bluntly
clear to the General that he would not under any circumstances permit the
Croatian exodus to advance further into British-occupied Austria, and that he
would deploy all forces he could muster to assist Basta in compelling
submission if required. Eventually, after passionate arguments on both sides,
Herencic recognised this aggressive display of force majeur, and reluctantly
accepted the surrender terms. General Basta assured Brigadier Scott that
everyone returned to Yugoslavia would be treated humanely and decently, and
that the Croats consequently had nothing to fear. Scott dutifully reported
this pledge to his superiors: whether he believed it is another matter.
Meanwhile in the fields to the south, lying just out of sight of the castle
of Bleiburg, a vast mass of people was gathered in a state of terror and
confusion. They comprised the vanguard of what was effectively a fleeing
nation. A
terrible panic began, as Basta’s Partisans opened fire from the woods on both
sides upon the largely defenceless crowd collected below in the valley. Many
people were wounded and killed. How many died in the fields beside Bleiburg I
have been unable as yet to establish with any precision. Over the years I
have obtained many accounts by eyewitnesses of what occurred. In addition
graves of the fallen have been identified, and it seems that subsequently
bodies were removed by the Austrian Black Cross and interred elsewhere. My
impression is that the number of fatalities at Bleiburg itself was not great
by comparison with what was happening elsewhere at the time, and may not have
amounted to more than a few score. This suggestion may be imperfectly
understood by many of the large number of Croats and sympathisers of other
nationalities who attend each year at the commemorative service on the site.
However I believe that as historical awareness advances, it will be
increasingly appreciated that the annual obsequies are observed in memory of
all those Croatian victims who died at the hands of the British and their
Communist allies during the dark days of 1945, and not just those who fell in
the immediate vicinity. The
great majority of people herded back to the guns of the Partisans were
massacred during ensuing weeks and months, after they had recrossed the
Yugoslav frontier. Thereafter they were subjected to the infamous death
marches, which still await exhaustive investigation. Fortunately, now that
Croatia is once again an independent nation, historians are at long last
enabled to examine the issue on a free and scientific basis. I
turn now from the grim but historically relatively straightforward succession
of events at Bleiburg to the vexed and convoluted question of British
responsibility for crimes against the Croatian people. The Supreme Allied
Commander in the Mediterranean was Field-Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, whose
authority extended to Southern Austria. His Headquarters had been established
at the royal palace of Caserta, outside Naples. The chain of command passed
down through 15 Army Group (General Mark Clark) at Florence, to the British 8
Army (General Sir Richard McCreery), whose headquarters was in north-east
Italy near Udine. 8 Army comprised two corps: 13 Corps, which faced Tito’s
forces in Trieste and along the Isonzo, and 5 Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir
Charles Keightley), which as has been seen occupied Southern Austria across
the Yugoslav frontier to the north. On 15 May Alexander reported to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff: ‘Approximately 600,00 German and Croat Troops of
Army Group E moving into Klagenfurt area’. For some twenty-four hours it was
wrongly believed at Caserta that a huge body of Croats had actually
surrendered to 5 Corps in Austria, and Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) was
obliged to decide what should be done with them. This error appears to have
arisen from a genuine misapprehension during successive transmissions of the
report from Austria. Clearly
Alexander felt that this influx was more than the British occupying force in
Austria, which consisted of a Corps comprising some 25,000 men, could be
expected to look after. On 16 May he issued this instruction to Air
Vice-Marshal Lee, his military emissary at Tito’s headquarters: "Commander
of Allied troops in Austria reports that approximately 200,000 Yugoslav
Nationals who were serving in German armed forces have surrendered to him. We
should like to turn over immediately to Marshal Tito’s forces and would be
grateful if Marshal Tito would agree to instruct his commanders to accept
them and to arrange with GOC Five Corps the rate at which they can be
received, and handing-over point on Austrian frontier south of Klagenfurt for
return to Yugoslavia". A
few days later Tito replied, thanking the Field-Marshal. By now however
events had overtaken these exchanges, and the Croats were already within the
Yugoslav dictator’s grasp. Hindsight and moral judgements should be employed
by historians with caution. My own belief, for what it be worth, is that
General Herencic committed a grave error when he agreed to surrender to
Basta. He was fully aware of the inevitable fate of the thousands of
unfortunate people for whom he was responsible. The alternative course would
have been to advance further into Austria, provoking Partisan attacks on
their flanks and British military resistance ahead. While the Domobran forces
were surely capable of fending off the Titoist irregulars, British artillery,
armour, and air power presented a formidable obstacle. However Scott himself
conceded that the forces at his disposal were insufficient to obstruct the
passage of the Croatian exodus for long. Scott’s decision to compel the
Croatian withdrawal appears to have been reached unilaterally, and at this
early phase of the British occupation I suggest that he had little choice but
to react to events as best he could with the scanty forces at his disposal.
Had Herencic ordered a peaceful advance and dispersal into the British zone,
it is certain that British troops would have opened fire, inflicting
casualties on the dense crowd of Croats whose likely extent is impossible to
estimate. At the same time it may be questioned whether British troops would
have continued for long shooting at a mass of panic-stricken and largely
defenceless fugitives. Evidence of the likely British response is available
in the contemporary logbook of Captain Nigel Nicolson, Intelligence Officer
to 1 Guards Brigade. Early on the evening of 19 May, 3 Grenadier Guards
reported: "10000 Croats just arrived at Ferlach. 3 GG told to tell all
Titoist in the neighbourhood and are NOT to let the Croats over bridge
whatever happens". However it was not long before the implications of
this order registered with 6 Armoured Division Headquarters, which half an
hour later issued this qualifying rider: ‘NOT
to fire at Croats if they attempt to rush bridge. (If they have women and
children)’. Such
were the circumstances of the Communist capture of the half-million or more
Croats fleeing from slaughter at the hands of the Communists. I now move to a
mysterious aspect of this tragedy, understanding of which has yet to be fully
achieved. As has been seen, the Croats at Bleiburg did not surrender to the
British, who cannot fairly bear more than tangential blame for the dreadful
atrocities which ensued. Certainly there exists nothing in international law
which requires a belligerent to accept the surrender of units demanding to be
taken prisoner. The Croatian surrender at Bleiburg took place on 15 May 1945.
As the War Diaries make clear, what daunted the Allied command was the
enormous number of fleeing troops and refugees reported to be advancing into
Carinthia, at a time when 5 Corps had barely established its presence in the
region, and when relations with Tito were dangerously inflammatory. Prior to
this, from 12 May onwards, numerous smaller bodies of Croatian soldiers and
civilians had succeeded either in arranging a formal surrender to British
forces, or in infiltrating undetected into their zone of occupation. Since it
was clearly unnecessary to guard people who were desperate to remain in
British custody, the fugitives were either directed to large camps improvised
for their reception, or simply told to stay put where they found themselves.
By 15 May 5 Corps reported to 8 Army that they held some 25,000 Croats. Prior
to the Bleiburg crisis, British forces had made no attempt to halt these
lesser incursions, and accepted their surrender without recorded reservation.
For the present the internees settled down as best they could in the British
zone, safe (so they thought) from the clutches of Tito’s executioners.
Marauding bands of Partisans who sought to open fire on the refugees in their
camps were deterred by patrolling British guards. Explicitly on occasion, and
implicitly throughout, the British command accepted that their 25,000
uninvited "guests" lay under the protection of international law.
The British Government was responsible for the protection and humane
treatment of prisoners-of-war under the terms of the 1929 Geneva Convention.
2
Initially 5 Corps Headquarters does not appear to have contemplated any other
course. Had they chosen otherwise, the refugees’ arrival in the British zone
of occupation could readily have been prevented, since across was confined to
bridges across the Drava. Such
was the situation up to the middle of May. Yet from the 15th onwards 5 Corps
policy towards the captive Croats changed drastically, from one in accord
with the laws of war and dictates of humanity to one of ruthless co-operation
with the greatest mass purge of the Yugoslav Communist regime. During the
third week of May arrangements were made for all Croats in Corps custody to
be transported into the hands of Tito, so that he might extend his genocidal
policy to those Croats who believed themselves safe from return to
Yugoslavia. Given the general awareness of Tito’s attitude towards the
wartime state of Croatia, the notoriously brutal nature of his regime, and
the atrocious behaviour of his troops within the British zone of Austria,
there can be little doubt that those who arranged their repatriation nurtured
no illusions about the fate to which their charges were being consigned. As
early as 13 may 1 Guards Brigade War Diary had reported : ‘Slovenes and Serbs
mostly concentrated [in] Viktring cage. None of these can be repatriated
except to almost certain death at hands of Tito’. If
that was the fate anticipated for the Serbs and Slovenes, how much worse was
it likely to be for the Croats! The Partisans made little attempt to disguise
their appetite for a bloody retribution. Until forcibly prevented by British
troops, they repeatedly attempted to murder inmates of Viktring camp, south
of Klagenfurt. On 25 May Captain Nicolson’s logbook recorded: ‘100
further Croats ... are already on the way to Yugoslavia by train - en
route for the slaughter-house ... Information came from Tito officer
who was in charge of loading of dump at Maria Elend’. What
was it that caused this dramatic and dishonourable change in policy? The
pattern of events shows clearly that the decisive intervention occurred on 13
May, when Harold Macmillan unexpectedly arrived at Corps Headquarters.
Macmillan was at the time Minister Resident in the Mediterranean, a post
which was effectively that of political adviser to Field-Marshal Alexander.
In this capacity he possessed authority to communicate directly with the Foreign
Office and the Prime Minister. On 12 May Macmillan had arranged with
Alexander to fly to 8 Army in north-east Italy, where he intended to consult
with General McCreery over the Allies’ deeply worsening relations with Tito.
As he reported to the Foreign Office on the eve of his departure, he intended
to advise McCreery on the political situation, and receive in return a
military assessment from those on the spot. Macmillan spent the evening of
the 12th visiting McCreery and Lieutenant-General Harding, whose 13 Corps
faced the Yugoslavs along the line of the Isonzo. At
this point there occurred a dramatic change to Macmillan’s schedule. Instead
of flying back to Naples as originally intended, he unexpectedly flew north
over the mountains into Austria. There he spent two hours in discussion with
Keightley and his staff. What happened at their conference can only be
inferred from the evidence, since Macmillan never disclosed the motive for
his altered itinerary and the nature of the discussion at 5 Corps Headquarters. In
his diary, which was probably compiled the next day, Macmillan expatiated at
some length on what was evidently one of the more important issues laid
before him by Keightley: ‘To
add to the confusion, thousands of so-called Ustashi or Chetniks, mostly with
wives and children, are fleeing in panic into this area in front of the
advancing Yugoslavs. These expressions, Ustashi and Chetnik, cover anything
from guerrilla forces raised by the Germans from Slovenes and Croats and
Serbs to fight Tito, and armed and maintained by the Germans - to people who,
either because they are Roman Catholics or Conservative in politics, or for
whatever cause are out of sympathy with revolutionary Communism and therefore
labelled as Fascists or Nazis. (This is a very simple formula, which in a
modified form is being tried, I observe, in English politics.). Macmillan’s
diary was compiled with a view to eventual publication, and is consequently
not always as candid or complete as it might otherwise have been. The passage
quoted invites some obvious questions, and cannot be naively taken au pied
de la lettre, as it has been by Macmillan’s sycophantic biographer Horne
and the authors of the Government-sponsored "Cowgill Report". Plausible
inferences may be drawn, categorised as follows: 1.
It is clear that the whole of this information derived from General
Keightley. 2.
Given the brief time available for their meeting, and the pressing urgency
which led Macmillan to alter his original travel plans so dramatically, the
topic is unlikely to have represented mere small talk. 3.
Though the passage recounting the visit to Klagenfurt is written in a style
appropriate to a personal journal, it conveys the impression of reflecting
the formal agenda which must have governed such a discussion. The topics
appear to be listed in order of importance. (I) The Yugoslavs had
openly declared their intention of annexing Southern Carinthia, where their
troops were behaving with increasing truculence. Macmillan concluded his account
of the meeting by explaining: "We had a conference with the general and
his [staff] officers covering much the same ground as those with Generals
McCreery and Harding yesterday. He gave us his story and we gave him ours. I
feel sure it was useful and helpful all round". Thus, as might be expected,
Keightley tabulated the major problems facing him in Austria, to which
Macmillan responded with appropriate advice or directions. It is surely
significant that each of the issues raised was governed by political factors,
which Macmillan was pre-eminently qualified to address. Macmillan paraphrases
the responses he provided for the first two issues. (I) The Yugoslav
aggression: "We have to look on, more or less hopelessly, since our
present plan is not to use force and not to promote [provoke?] an
incident". However no indication appears in
Macmillan’s diary as to what if any advice he proffered on problem (iii).
This omission appears the more curious the closer it is considered. The first
point to note is that, if we discount Macmillan’s characteristically florid
language, his account implies that Keightley’s report on the Yugoslav refugees
was explicit and detailed. It covers the whole language of anti-Communist
Yugoslavs held at Viktring and elsewhere by 5 Corps at the time of
Macmillan’s arrival: 1. ‘Chetnik’ Slovenian
troops, being ‘guerrilla forces armed and maintained by the Germans ... to
fight Tito’: i.e. Slovenian Domobranci. 2. Croatian forces,
falsely categorised en blocas ‘so-called Ustashi’, in reality largely
comprising ‘guerrilla forces armed and maintained by the Germans ... to fight
Tito’: i.e. Croatian Domobrani 3. ‘Chetnik’ Serbs: i.e.
anti-Tito Serbian formations acting under the authority of Generals
Mihailovic or Nedic. The first three groupings were accompanied ‘mostly with
wives and children’. 4. Roman Catholic and
Conservative elements ‘out of sympathy with revolutionary Communism’: i.e.
civilians from varied ethnic groups in Yugoslavia who had reason to fear a
Communist take-over. Macmillan’s listing is confirmed
by the War Diary of 6 Armoured Division for the same day, which reported:
‘Position with regard to surrendered personnel in the Divisional area was now
very roughly as follows:- ... 'Mercenary Tps. (a) In battle Group
Seeler 21,000 Slovenes, Serbs and [White] Macmillan’s account of his
conference with Keightley remains the only full version available, since both
of Keightley’s senior staff officers, Brigadiers Low (Aldington) and
Tryon-Wilson, deny having been present. (The absence of the Corps Commander’s
two senior staff officers on such an occasion is remarkable). 5 Corps must
have presumably have recorded a summary for its own reference, but if so it
has disappeared from the War Diary along with so much else that the British
Government subsequently deemed compromising. Accordingly we are obliged to
rely on Macmillan’s version, which at least has the advantage of being
written at the time. However analysis reveals some curious anomalies. Macmillan records the advice he
gave in respect of the first two of Keightley’s points, but does not reveal
his response to the question of the Yugoslav refugees. The omission is
curious, in that so far as the Cossacks were concerned Keightley had already
received precise instructions how to treat captured Russians, in the form of
a carefully-worded directive issued by 8 Army on 13 March. In the case of the
Yugoslavs, however, the position was unclear. On 3 May 8 Army had issued a
ruling that "Chetnicks, troops of Mihailovitch, and other dissident
Yugoslavs ... will be regarded as surrendered personnel and will be treated
accordingly. The ultimate disposal of these personnel will be decided on
Government levels". The context of the order, however, was the surrender
of all German forces in Italy. Furthermore it contained no explicit allusion
to Croats, thousands of whom had now surrendered to 5 Corps. It seems inconceivable that
Keightley did not seek Macmillan’s advice on this essentially political
question, and that Macmillan did not provide him with some guidance. The
picture becomes the more puzzling when Macmillan’s motive for unexpectedly
flying to Klagenfurt is taken into account. The authors of the "Cowgill
Report" assert that Macmillan flew to meet Keightley in order to explain
to him the need for extreme tact in dealing with the Yugoslavs, since three
days earlier Keightley had requested permission from McCreery to be permitted
to shoot at Yugoslavs who disobeyed British commanders.3 Though
advanced as settled fact, this suggestion represents pure speculation, and is
clearly designed to substantiate the Report’s thesis that Macmillan only
encountered the refugee problem in Austria en passant, and played no
material part in the decision to have them despatched to the Communists. Had Macmillan thought it
necessary to advise Keightley in person there can be little doubt that he
would have planned to fly to Austria at the outset of his expedition.
Moreover this does not explain why he subsequently concealed the decision to
repatriate the Cossacks and Yugoslavs from the Foreign Office. Recently a senior staff officer
at 5 Corps Headquarters confirmed the accuracy of my suggestion that
Keightley contacted Macmillan while he was with McCreery, and requested him
to fly north and advise him how he should treat the Cossack. In a recorded
interview held at the Imperial War Museum, Brigadier C.E. Tryon-Wilson
recalled in 1990 that during the Italian campaign, "I think when the history
of that campaign is dealt with you will find that in many cases 5 Corps were
in a position sometimes to go to Harold Macmillan, sometimes direct to
Alex". Going on to describe the
problems facing 5 Corps in Austria, the Brigadier recalled a visit he made on
10 or 11 May to red Army Headquarters at Voitsberg. "Now soon after we arrived
in there [Austria] - and it was within a few days of General Keightley going
up - I was asked to go up for two reasons, really: one was to have a look at
the area through which we might have to operate; and secondly to make a contact
with the other side. I didn’t at that particular time go up with any
instructions, or intention to talk about the handing over of the Cossack.
Because - again, I refer to the 78 Div ones - they were moved a long way, in
the hopes that the Russians didn’t know too much about them, because they
didn’t want them to be handed back. 46 Div, which was much closer, had quite
a lot. General Keightley had prior to that (I think) - my journey - he had (I
think, rightly) he had already had contact with General - with Harold
Macmillan. And he’d told him what the problem was, and he had mentioned - or
perhaps he’d mentioned that we had some White Russians. But we certainly at
that particular stage, until the 15th I know (and it’s a thing which sticks
in my mind) we really didn’t know the numbers or the names of anybody,
because we had to tell the Divisions they had to feed the chaps out of the
reserves that they’d got there. And Harold Macmillan had said: "Well,
look, if you’re going to hand these chaps back, and you want to hand them
back, the only thing I can do is tell you that you’ll get a better deal if
you go directly to the top - not through an intermediate. And we suggest that
you go straight to General Tolbukhin and sort the thing out".4 Brigadier
Anthony Cowgill, Lord Brimelow, and Christopher Booker, The
Repatriations from Austria in 1945: The Report of an Inquiry (London,
1990), pp. 4 The advice Tryon-Wilson ascribed to Macmillan appears a little
confused, but its principal point is plain. Keightley requested Macmillan’s
attendance specifically for the purpose of advising him on the policy he
should pursue with regard to the Cossacks. Furthermore this first-hand
account confirms that prior to Macmillan’s visit 5 Corps had been anxious to
protect the Cossacks from betrayal to the Soviets. Precisely what the
Minister said to Keightley is not recorded, but the gist of it is
indisputable. Ten days later Keightley informed 8 Army commander General
McCreery: "As a result of verbal directive from Macmillan to Corps Comd
at recent meeting we have undertaken to return all Soviet Nationals in Corps
area to Soviet forces". Hitherto both Keightley and Macmillan had
withheld all reference to this "verbal directive" from their
colleagues, and the only reason that the 5 Corps Commander chose to reveal it
was in the context of an attempt to reverse a newly-received order from
Alexander forbidding him to use force to compel Cossacks to return
"home". At present I a, concerned with
the fate of the Croats rather than that of the Cossacks. However there exists
abundant reason to believe that the repatriation of both peoples represented
the outcome of an identical policy decision. Before Macmillan’s arrival the
evidence indicates that 5 Corps had neither the intention nor the desire to
hand anyone over to be maltreated or killed. Thereafter a radical shift in
policy occurred, which required extensive deception of the Allied command, to
say nothing of the unfortunate prisoners. The 5 Corps war diary and other
military records have been substantially doctored, a procedure which would
scarcely have been necessary had all proceedings been above board. The
"Cowgill Committee" was at pains to scout the idea of any
conspiratorial activity on the part of Macmillan or Keightley, on general
grounds of implausibility. However it is possible to provide a telling
example of the ingenuity with which Macmillan succeeded in duping his
"friend" Alexander. On this return to Naples on 14 May Macmillan succeeded
in persuading Alexander’s Chief Administrative Officer, General Robertson, to
issue an order requiring the handover of Cossacks and Yugoslavs to the Soviet
and Yugoslav Communists. Macmillan’s diary is silent sent late that night by
Alexander Kirk, Macmillan’s American counterpart as political adviser to
Alexander, to the State Department in Washington. ‘This afternoon General
Robertson, Chief Administrative Officer AFHQ requested us to concur in a
draft telegram to CG British Eight Army authorising him to turn over 28,000
Cossacks (see our 797 of October 16, 1944, Midnight), including women and
children to Marshal Tolbukhin, and further instructing him to turn over to
Yugoslav Partisans a large number of dissident Yugoslav troops with exception
of Chetniks. ‘General Robertson stated that Macmillan, who talked with CG
Eight Army yesterday, had recommended this course of action. We asked whether
the Russians had requested that these Cossacks be turned over to them, and
Robertson replied in the negative and added "But they probably will
soon". We also asked General Robertson what definition he proposed to
give to "Chetnicks" and he was very vague on this point. We then
stated we could not concur without referring the matter to our Government.
CAO expressed disappointment that we did not seem to agree with him on this
point but added that he was faced with a grave administrative problem with
hundreds of thousands of German POW’s on his hands and could not bother at
this time about who might or might not be turned over to the Russians and
Partisans to be shot. He would have to send his telegram in spite of our
non-concurrence. ‘Department’s views would be
appreciated urgently’. Given this conflict of opinion
between the US and British Political Advisers, it is likely that Robertson
would have reverted to Macmillan for confirmation of the course he now
adopted. At 4.36 that afternoon (14th) Robertson despatched an order to 8
Army for onward transmission to Knightly, which required the prompt hangover
of ‘Russians’ (i.e. the Cossacks), and concluded with this instruction: ‘All
surrendered personnel of established Yugoslav nationality who were serving in
German Forces should be disarmed and handed over to Yugoslav forces’. Copies
were sent to Alexander’s Chief of Staff, General Morgan, who was on the point
of departing on an extended mission to North Italy and Austria, and
Macmillan. Significantly none was sent to Kirk, who would have observed that
even the tentative saving clause regarding ‘Chetniks’ was dropped from the
final version. The omission suggests that it was included in the draft in
what proved to be the vain hope of gaining Kirk’s. Having decided to proceed
without his approval, Macmillan and Robertson seized the opportunity of
extending the order. It was this order which those responsible at 5 Corps
employed as justification for the repatriation operations which continued
throughout the second half of May. It is a strange but seemingly indisputable
fact that Alexander remained wholly unaware of the existence of this order
until 21 May. Precisely how it was kept from him is uncertain, but the events
which followed establish the omission beyond reasonable doubt. From 16 May
onwards he was engaged in elaborate discussions with Eisenhower, whose
purpose was the evacuation of the Cossacks to SHAEF custody. At the same time
it was his declared intention to transport the Yugoslav prisoners and
refugees in Austria to camps in Italy. It was not until 21 May that General
McCreery came to query the discrepancy between this policy and that
prescribed in the ‘Robertson order’, in response to which Alexander issued
fresh clarificatory orders. It would be absurd to suppose that the two
Supreme Allied Commanders went to all this trouble in the full knowledge that
a diametrically different policy was already being put into effect.
Fortunately it is unnecessary to rely on inference and general grounds of
plausibility, since evidence of extensive deception is further to be detected
in the contemporary records. On 17 May Alexander issued this emotive appeal
for direction to the Combined Chiefs of Staff: ‘To assist us in clearing
congestion in Southern Austria we urgently require direction regarding final
disposal following three classes: (a) Approximately 50,000
Cossacks including 11,000 women, children and old men. These have been part
of German armed forces and fighting against Allies. In each of above cases to return
them to their country of origin immediately might be fatal to their health.
Request decision as early as possible as to final disposal’. The wording indicates plainly
enough the extent of Alexander’s humanitarian concern for the helpless
fugitives, and his objection to delivering them to their enemies. In the
present context, however, the content of the signal is of secondary concern
to the manner of its transmission. Though the format establishes that the
message emanated from the Supreme Allied Commander in person, it was actually
despatched from the office of his Chief Administrative Officer, General
Robertson. This represented regular procedure, though in this instance it
raises a significant query concerning Robertson’s role in the policy of
forced repatriation. Three days earlier, at
Macmillan’s instigation, he had issued the infamous ‘Robertson order’ cited supra,
which ordered 8 Army to hand over ‘all Russians’ to the Soviets and ‘all
Yugoslavs serving in German forces’ to Tito. When he received his copy of the
Field-Marshal’s signal of 17 May, Robertson must have recognised that
Alexander was unaware of the existence of the prior order, which conflicted
with his concern for the prisoners’ welfare and made his appeal to Eisenhower
superfluous. Why in that case did he not alert Alexander to the discrepancy? 5 It appears inescapable that
Robertson deliberately withheld reference to his order of 14 May, whose
callous provisions he well knew flouted the humanitarian intentions of the
Field-Marshal. It may perhaps be questioned whether a such a deception was
possible within the tightly-knit framework of a military headquarters. Alexander
was notoriously a ‘hands off’ commander, who was inclined to leave much of
the routine work to his capable subordinates. However this may be,
fortunately there exists confirmatory evidence of the extent of the deception
and indicates the skilful manner in which it was effected. It will be recalled that late on
14 May Alexander Kirk, the American political adviser at AFHQ had reported to
the State Department his dissent to Robertson’s proposal to hand over
Yugoslav prisoners to Tito. The proposed move was in direct violation of
agreed Allied policy, and on 16 May Assistant Secretary of State Grew
instructed Kirk to lodge a formal protest with AFHQ on behalf of the US
Government. The same day (17 May) that Alexander issued his appeal to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, Kirk’s deputy Carmel Offie registered formal
objection with the Deputy Chief of Staff (General Lemnitzer), General
Robertson, and Harold Macmillan: ‘I wish to refer to my
non-concurrence in the telegram which the CAO despatched to MACMIS with regard
to disposition of certain Yugoslav nationals who have surrendered to the
Allies. ‘The Department of State has
informed me urgently that in its opinion no distinction should be made
between dissident Yugoslav troops and Chetniks and that the American position,
with which the Foreign Office has agreed, with respect to dissident Yugoslav
troops or anti-Partisans, has clearly been established. ‘You will recall that the
British Ambassador in Belgrade proposed some two weeks ago that there were
three alternatives available in connection with handling of these Yugoslavs: (a) that they should be
used as auxiliary troops; At that time the Department of
State and the British Foreign Office agreed that alternative (c) was the only
possible solution. ‘In summary, therefore, we
believe that the troops in question who wish to surrender to American or
British commanders in Northeast Italy should be disarmed and placed in base
camps for investigation; that those wishing to return to Yugoslavia as
individuals should be permitted to do so; and that all others should be
removed to refugee camps and those against whom there is evidence of war crimes
should be handled as such’. Alexander needed no persuading in this respect,
and it was on the same day (17 May) that he issued an order providing for the
evacuation of Chetnik and other ‘dissident’ Yugoslav prisoners in Austria to
camps in the rear area of Northern Italy known as District One (‘Distone’).
Next day a gratified Kirk reported back to the State Department: ‘S[upreme]
A[llied] C[ommander] has informed Eight Army and ... Fifteenth Army Group
that chetniks and dissident Yugoslavs infiltrations into areas occupied by
allied troops should be treated as disarmed enemy troops and evacuated to
BRIT concentration area. Total number believed about 35,000 AFHQ taking up
question of final disposition’. The order (known as ‘Distone’)
to which Kirk referred required the evacuation of all surrendered Serbian,
Slovene, and Montenegrin troops in Austria to camps in Italy, where thousands
of their compatriots who had earlier surrendered in Italy were held. No
reference was made in the order to the estimated 25,000 Croat troops held by
5 Corps in Austria, since the ruling had been issued in response to a
specific enquiry from the 5 Corps Chief of Staff (Brigadier Low) regarding
the disposition of ‘Jugoslav Royal Army? units. The Croats could not be
quartered alongside their inveterate enemies, and so it was necessary to
retain them for the time being in Austria. Any decision as to the ultimate
fate of all these captured troops of Yugoslav nationality now rested with the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, to whom Alexander had referred the question on 16
May. So far as Kirk was concerned all
appeared to be well. AFHQ policy was now in alignment with that agreed by the
United States and Great Britain, and there appeared no longer to be any
question of repatriating fugitives to be butchered by a vengeful Tito. More
than two months were to pass before Kirk discovered that both he and
Alexander had been victims of an elaborate deception practised by their own
colleagues. It was on 14 May that General
Robertson showed Kirk the draft of the order approved by Macmillan, which
provided for the handover of all Yugoslav prisoners held in Austria.
Robertson had ignored Kirk’s protest, and shortly afterwards issued his
notorious order FX 75383 providing for what he cynically anticipated would be
the likely slaughter of Cossacks and Yugoslavs. However the text of the
formal US protest of 17 May lodged at AFHQ reveals that by then Kirk’s office
had come into possession of what they presumed to be a copy of Robertson’s
order. Kirk’s deputy Carmel Offie referred to it as ‘The telegram which the
CAO [Robertson] despatched to MACMIS with regard to disposition of certain
Yugoslav nationals who have surrendered to the Allies’. The reference betrays the manner
in which the American Political Adviser was duped. ‘MACMIS’ was the
abbreviation for the Maclean Mission to Tito, a section of which was based at
Trieste to report on Yugoslav moves in the disputed frontier zone. In
reality, however, the sole order sent to Macmis ‘with regard to disposition
of certain Yugoslav nationals who have surrendered to the Allies’ was not
Robertson’s order FX 75383 of 14 May, but Alexander’s signal FX 75902 of the
15th, which arranged for the return to Tito of the 200,000 Croats. Since the
belief that the 200,000 had surrendered to the British was swiftly discovered
to be mistaken, the second signal effectively became dead letter as soon as
it was issued. It was in this ingenious manner
that Offie was gulled into believing that the signal effectively set aside
Alexander’s order of 17th May was that which Robertson had Shawn Kirk on 14
May. On 18 May Kirk accordingly reported to the State Department that
Alexander had issued orders superseding Robertson’s signal, which
consequently no longer posed a threat to Yugoslav prisoners. All must now
have appeared well both to Kirk and Alexander, who were however unaware that
the real Robertson order had not been explicitly superseded. It was retained
by 5 Corps, who were to use it as justification for their subsequent handover
of tens of thousands of Yugoslav nationals. It was this Machiavellian
procedure which enabled the Robertson order to remain dormant, awaiting
reactivation when required. The conspiracy involved a high
degree of skilful duplicity, with the consequence that its unravelling is
also a fairly complex process. A brief summary of successive events will
however serve to clarify events. 13 May 14 May 16 May Alexander accordingly requests
directions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the disposal of Yugoslavs in
Austria. Again, it is inconceivable that he would have done this had he been
aware of the existence of the Robertson order, which already provided for
them. 17 May Aldington at 5 Corps issues the
following order, extending the category of those required to be repatriated,
and taking care not to transmit a copy to higher command: ‘all Yugoslav nationals at
present in the Corps area will be handed over to Tito forces as soon as
possible. These forces will be disarmed immediately but will NOT be told of
their destination. Arrangements for the handover will be co-ordinated by HQ
in conjunction with Yugoslav forces. Handover will last over a period owing
to difficulties of Yugoslav acceptance. Fmns will be responsible for escorting
personnel to a selected point notified by this HQ where they will be taken
over by Tito forces’. General McCreery instructs
Keightley: 18 May 19 May 21 May It must be apparent by now who
was masterminding this elaborate train of deception. Macmillan enjoyed a
particularly close working relationship with Robertson. On 8 January 1945,
for example, he noted in his diary: ‘I like doing business with General
Robertson, for he is a very clever man’. It was probably on the morning of 14
May that he approached the General, explaining the problem (as he saw it) of
the Russian and Yugoslav prisoners whose surrender has been accepted by 5
Corps. Between them they devised the order despatched that day to 5 Corps,
which flouted Allied policy by requiring the handover of Yugoslav prisoners
to Tito. This move was kept a closely-guarded secret from Alexander, whose
ignorance is proved inter alia>by his elaborate arrangements in
keeping with Allied policy. It was Alexander’s ‘Distone
order’ of 17 May that endangered the whole conspiracy, which depended on the
Robertson order’s surviving unrepealed at 5 Corps. It can be seen why Lord
Aldington was so concerned at the 1989 libel hearing to pretend that the
‘Distone’ order for some mysterious reason never reached his Headquarters (to
which it was directed), and why his neighbour Judge Davies was at equal pains
to withhold from the jury the evidence which proved the contrary. It was on 15 may that Assistant
Secretary of State Joseph Grew required Kirk to protest against the issuing
of the ‘Robertson order’, and on 17 May that Kirk’s deputy office reported
that he had registered his ‘non-concurrence in the telegram which the CAO
despatched to MACMIS’. The likely date on which Offie was accordingly 16 May.
On that day Macmillan spent some time with Offie, advising him on signals to
be sent to the State Department, after which: ‘As part of regular routine, I
had a conference with General Robertson on various Italian questions ...’ Historians have increasingly
come to recognise the extent to which deviousness and duplicity ranked among
Macmillan’s prevailing characteristics, along with a cynical contempt for
humanity. He possessed both motive and opportunity for misleading the
Americans, and the substitution of Alexander’s outdated signal FX 75902 of 15
May for Robertson’s FX 75383 of the 14th was precisely the sort of deception
was the condemnation to almost certain death of some 50,000 people merely
inflated the sense of power which Macmillan’s deeply-rooted sense of
inferiority ceaselessly craved. I have not space here to analyse
the complex machinations which followed over the next week, which confirmed
the fate of the unsuspecting Croatian prisoners-of-war. Suffice it to say
that between 19 and 22 May thousands of Croats were transported to the hands
of Tito’s executioners by means of further lying and deception. It was not until August that
Kirk came to learn of the deception which had been practised on him. On 14
August he reported bleakly to the State Department: ‘On receipt to your
telegram 719, August 6 we addressed memorandum to Supreme Allied Commander in
accordance with Department’s instructions. We have today been informed by
Deputy Chief of Staff on behalf of Supreme Allied Commander that decision to
turn over to Tito Yugoslav nationals under reference was made on grounds of
military necessity in view of conditions existing at that time. It was stated
that Supreme Allied Commander took note of our non-concurrence and pointed
out that British Resident Minister had concurred in proposed action but that
in any event Supreme Allied Commander took his decision because of conditions
existing of which he was better aware than Dept. The communication from
Deputy Chief of Staff added that in view of divergent political views
expressed to him on subject, by Resident Minister and ourselves, Supreme
Allied Commander suspended transfer of dissident troops as soon as emergency
conditions ceased to exist. It was set forth that while Supreme Allied
Commander of course seeks the advice of his political advisers on all
occasions he must reserve unto himself right to decide matters of an urgent
military nature as he sees fit. ‘In conversation with Alexander this morning
he stated to us that he was obligated to receive surrender of almost 1,000,00
Germans in mid-May and could not deal with anti-Tito Yugoslavs as he would have
liked. We stated we had nothing to add to our memorandum under reference
except to point out to him again that Resident Minister acted contrary to
policy agreed upon after consultation by Department and Foreign Office. British apologists for mass
murder gleefully seized upon this signal to ascribe responsibility to
Alexander for the repatriation operations, and so to absolve the Conservative
prime Minister Macmillan. Such an interpretation is not only diametrically at
variance with the evidence, but is implicitly refuted by the very explanation
reported by Kirk. Alexander’s explanation that ‘in view of divergent
political views expressed to him on subject, by Resident Minister and
ourselves, Supreme Allied Commander suspended transfer of dissident troops as
soon as emergency conditions ceased to exist’ can only refer to the Bleiburg
crisis on 15 May and the ‘Distone order? of 17 May, which required the
evacuation of ‘dissident’ Chetniks to Italy. It was characteristic of
Alexander that he should accept blame for the misdeeds of his colleagues and
subordinates. As one of his ablest generals recalled: ‘Anyhow you had a great
feeling of trust in him [Alex] as you knew that he would back you whatever
happened, and that if things went wrong, he would accept full responsibility
for far more than his own share of the blame’.6 In any case Kirk must by this
time have acquired a fairly full appreciation of what had occurred in
reality, and he made it plain whom he believed to be ultimately responsible
for the treachery and slaughter: ‘We stated we had nothing to add
to our memorandum under reference except to point out to him again that
Resident Minister acted contrary to policy agreed upon after
consultation by Department and Foreign Office’. THE STATUS OF SURRENDERED
CROATS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW FOOTNOTES 1 Herbert
Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London, 1951), p. 186 2 Cf
Appendix 3
Brigadier Anthony Cowgill, Lord Brimelow, and Christopher Booker, The
Repatriations from Austria in 1945: The Report of an Inquiry (London,
1990), pp. 4 The
authors of the "Cowgill Report" refer to my suggestion 'that
Macmillan flew to Klegenfurt 'expressly' to discuss the problem of
the Cossacks' as one of a succession of 'unfounded assumptions'. Since
Brigadier Tryon-Wilson was himself a member of the 'Cowgill Committee', the
authors must have been aware of the validity of my conjecture. 5 The
'Cowgill Committee' (of which Aldington was an unacknowledged member) was
clearly embarrassed by this inconsistency, to which its authors provide this
curious attempt at an answer: "We do not know how consciously he
[Robertson] was seeking political cover for the order he had given in the heat
of a grave emergency three days before' (The Repatriations from Austria in
1945, i. p. 75). To which it is sufficient to respond (i) that the text
emanated from Alexander, and was merely transmitted by Robertson; (ii) by no
possible interpretation can it be interpreted as 'seeking political cover'
for an order to which it makes no reference, whose provisions were in direct
conflict with those indicated in Alexander's signal. 6
Unpublished memoir of General Sir Oliver Leese. 7 Gustav
Rasmussen (ed.), Code des prisonniers de Guerre: Commentaire de la convention
du 27 juillet 1929 relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre
(Copenhagen, 1931), p. 130. This clause reflected a provision enshrined in
Article 13 of the Hague Convention (ibid., pp. 26-27). |
